Warning signs have begun to flash with increasing urgency, suggesting that the possibility of a large-scale, high-intensity conflict with China could rapidly deplete the United States’ missile reserves. Such a scenario would leave the nation, despite its technological prowess, at a severe disadvantage in a sustained military engagement. Analytical simulations and war games repeatedly underscore this vulnerability: in a potential confrontation over Taiwan—an especially volatile flashpoint—American forces could find themselves exhausting their stock of long-range, precision-guided munitions within the span of mere days, in some estimates less than a week. Once those advanced weapons are spent, the challenges of replenishing them amid a continuing war would exert immense strain on both industrial capacity and fiscal resources. Even a preemptive effort to expand missile production before the outbreak of hostilities would demand enormous financial investments and stretch the defense manufacturing base to its limits.
Confronted with this looming problem, several defense technology firms have started to pivot away from the Pentagon’s traditional preference for highly sophisticated and prohibitively expensive weapon systems. Instead, they are advocating a model centered on affordability, simplicity, and large-scale manufacturability. This shift represents not merely a financial adjustment but a philosophical one—favoring practical adaptability and quantity over perfected complexity. In a recent episode of the *Cogs of War* podcast, key executives from firms such as Anduril, Mach Industries, and Castelion participated in a wide-ranging discussion with *War on the Rocks* founder Ryan Evans. They explained how their respective companies are pursuing innovative approaches to produce economical missile systems that can be built quickly, in greater numbers, and at a fraction of the cost of traditional munitions.
Steve Milano, senior director of advanced effects at Anduril, captured the essence of this emerging doctrine. He emphasized what he termed the “affordable mass problem” confronting all U.S. military services. According to Milano, it is no longer sufficient to rely exclusively on “exquisite” weapons—that is, premium, technologically unrivaled systems designed for pinpoint effectiveness—but rather essential to ensure both affordability and adequate scale in missile and ammunition supplies. As part of that mission, Anduril unveiled its Barracuda missile line, a family of adaptable cruise missiles available in multiple configurations based on range, payload, and physical size. Milano revealed during the podcast that Anduril’s first dedicated Barracuda production facility is expected to open in January 2026, projecting an ambitious output rate of roughly 2,000 units per shift. This figure signifies a remarkable escalation in manufacturing tempo compared with legacy production cycles.
Yet scaling up such efforts has always been constrained by the complex architecture of existing weapons programs. Traditional missile development depends heavily on elaborate supply chains, bespoke components, and acquisition procedures that can take years to navigate. These slow-moving mechanisms limit the potential to ramp up production during emergencies and often render cost-effective mass production impossible. Anduril’s approach, in contrast, labels Barracuda as a “software-defined” missile, one capable of receiving digital upgrades through software adjustments that respond swiftly to evolving enemy tactics and countermeasures. The company maintains that this reconfigurability helps mitigate a central U.S. vulnerability—namely, the danger that precision-guided weapons will be expended far faster than they can be replaced in a major conflict.
When Anduril initially announced Barracuda, it pointed out that the broader U.S. defense industrial base suffers from chronic inflexibility. Lengthy production timelines, intricate missile construction, and an overreliance on specialized materials have created an ecosystem ill-suited to wartime surge demands. Castelion’s chief executive, Sean Pitt, corroborated this observation on the same podcast. He explained that his company had identified similar inefficiencies and responded by focusing on the development of cost-effective hypersonic missiles—a domain typically associated with extreme expense and engineering complexity. Castelion’s flagship project, the Blackbeard missile, has been under active testing for several years, with deployment anticipated in 2027. U.S. Army budget records describe Blackbeard as a “launched effect” for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), hinting at its potential utility for engaging fleeting, time-sensitive targets at dramatically reduced cost per strike compared to other precision weapons.
Mach Industries has followed a parallel route, recently securing an Army contract for its Viper vertical-takeoff strategic strike cruise missile. Remarkably, the Viper boasts a unit production cost below $100,000 when manufactured at scale—a compelling indicator of its affordability focus. CEO Ethan Thornton explained that Mach Industries has centered its engineering philosophy on two key optimizations: asymmetry and survivability. The company’s objective is to deploy large numbers of resilient, low-cost munitions capable of enduring modern defenses and overwhelming adversaries through numerical superiority rather than singular technological dominance.
Together, Anduril, Castelion, and Mach Industries are attempting to fundamentally disrupt the entrenched economics and supply-chain hierarchies of the American missile ecosystem. Their shared ambitions extend beyond merely reducing costs or simplifying blueprints—they aim to accelerate defense innovation by shortening upgrade cycles and increasing responsiveness to threat evolution. Importantly, these emerging players do not necessarily view themselves as direct rivals to established defense contractors—known as “the primes”—whose long-standing relationships with the Department of Defense and decades of expertise remain indispensable to national security. Indeed, as Milano acknowledged, while some friction exists between newcomers and traditional giants, both sides ultimately serve complementary roles: the primes provide foundational industrial capacity, while younger firms inject agility, software-driven flexibility, and a Silicon Valley-style appetite for experimentation.
Recent conflicts globally have vividly demonstrated the urgency of these efforts. U.S. intervention in the Middle East, aimed at intercepting Houthi-launched missiles and defending Israel against Iranian rocket salvos, consumed large volumes of advanced interceptors from systems like THAAD, SM-2, SM-3, and SM-6, each carrying significant replacement costs. Similarly, the war in Ukraine has depleted stocks of Patriot interceptor missiles, while concerns mount regarding the remaining inventory of Tomahawk cruise missiles. Such logistical attrition underscores the uncomfortable truth that even the world’s largest military can see its arsenals strained under sustained operational demand.
Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, has further warned that worldwide deployments have already eroded reserves of key air-to-air munitions—capabilities critical for any engagement within the Indo-Pacific, the theater he describes as both the most demanding and potentially the most perilous. Paparo cautioned that this depletion directly compromises America’s readiness to confront its most capable prospective adversary, China.
To counter these vulnerabilities, the emerging paradigm in missile production mirrors the dynamism of the technology sector: rapid prototyping, iterative design, and frequent software updates. The Pentagon and the armed services, particularly the Army, are increasingly adopting this mindset, leveraging new technologies such as artificial intelligence, autonomy, and advanced drone systems to modernize operational readiness. Within this redefined framework, quantity, adaptability, and production speed are becoming as critical to deterrence as precision or sophistication. The logic is clear—possessing large, diverse, and affordable stockpiles of munitions may ultimately prove to be a more decisive factor in a peer-level war than holding a smaller inventory of elite, high-cost weapons. This shift, still unfolding, may very well determine whether the United States can remain prepared in an era when industrial capacity and technological agility are as vital to victory as strategy and resolve.
Sourse: https://www.businessinsider.com/us-companies-making-cheaper-missiles-conflict-like-war-with-china-2025-10
