A senior leader within the United States Space Force recently issued a striking warning that underscores growing concern within Washington’s defense community: China’s rapid advancement in space-based technologies is allowing it to close the gap with remarkable speed. Brigadier General Brian Sidari, who serves as the deputy chief of space operations for intelligence, spoke candidly at the Air & Space Forces Association’s Air, Space, and Cyber Conference last month. His remarks reflected a deep unease about how efficiently Beijing has built up the complex infrastructure of satellites, launch systems, and orbital capabilities that underpin modern warfare. According to Sidari, China’s progress demonstrates that its leaders have studied the United States’ command of space very closely and now clearly comprehend how critical orbital systems are to the coordination and effectiveness of joint military forces.
The data highlighting this ascent is striking. China’s number of space launches has increased by more than thirty percent compared with the previous year. After successfully deploying two hundred satellites into orbit in 2023, the nation has now doubled that figure within a year, signaling not only sustained effort but immense industrial capacity. Furthermore, China is methodically constructing two large-scale constellations of low-Earth-orbit satellites that in concept resemble Elon Musk’s Starlink network — systems capable of delivering communications resilience and global data coverage. These developments form only a portion of Beijing’s sweeping five-year strategy for space dominance. The country has enlarged its fleet of launch vehicles, consistently modernized its satellite platforms, and expanded its launch infrastructure to accommodate more frequent and faster orbital missions. Reports have also surfaced of experimental satellites capable of close-proximity maneuvers — often described as “dogfighting” satellites — which could, in theory, be used to disable or capture adversarial spacecraft.
Within Beijing’s hierarchy of strategic ambitions, both space and counter-space technologies stand among the highest priorities. According to assessments by the U.S. Department of Defense, China is systematically designing tools that could interfere with, damage, or entirely destroy an opponent’s space assets. Such tools span a wide spectrum: co-orbital satellites that can approach others in flight, precision anti-satellite missiles, sophisticated electronic warfare instruments, advanced surveillance payloads, reusable spacecraft, and even directed-energy weapons capable of projecting destructive force without physical contact. These capabilities, highlighted extensively in the Pentagon’s annual report on Chinese military power, reveal a comprehensive effort to ensure that China cannot be denied influence or operational control within space.
Beyond technological expansion, Beijing has undertaken significant institutional reforms to accelerate progress. The recent reorganization of the military branch that governs space, cyber, and information warfare suggests a determination to create a more integrated and agile command structure. In the Pentagon’s 2024 review of Chinese military development, analysts emphasized that China’s “space enterprise continues to mature rapidly,” noting that Beijing has dedicated major financial and human resources to enhancing every dimension of its program — from straightforward civil and commercial applications to cutting-edge military functions intended to challenge U.S. supremacy.
Despite this momentum, American officials maintain that China’s capabilities overall remain behind those of the United States. Still, General Sidari stressed that the pace at which Beijing is mastering reusable launch technologies — the kind of innovation that revolutionized the economics of American spaceflight — could soon alter that balance. Of particular concern to U.S. strategists are China’s ambitions to create large satellite constellations that mimic the resiliency and data throughput of existing Western megaconstellations. Sidari observed that Chinese planners have carefully studied how these networks enhance operational awareness and have begun replicating the model with tremendous speed.
Other senior U.S. Space Force officers have highlighted additional indicators of China’s progress. Chief Master Sergeant Ron Lerch, speaking during the same conference, described recent on-orbit refueling experiments involving China’s SJ-25 and SJ-21 satellites as “game-changing,” displaying a newfound ability to extend satellite lifespan and autonomy. Yet, he acknowledged that China’s cadence of launches remains slower than that of the United States, leaving it with more limited access to orbit. Nonetheless, even this constraint is narrowing year by year as Chinese industrial capacity expands.
Recent missions illustrate that China’s space program continues to blend scientific aims with potential military utility. The launch of the Yaogan-45 remote-sensing satellite, for instance, has been publicly described as supporting agricultural assessment, disaster monitoring, and environmental studies. However, defense experts suspect that such systems could equally serve reconnaissance and surveillance roles. Observers have also noted that the satellite’s placement in a medium-Earth orbit — unusually high for this category — implies that China seeks not only broader coverage but also layered resilience against threats, ensuring that data collection would persist even during orbital disruptions.
This dual-use nature of Chinese space technology exemplifies the nation’s longstanding doctrine of civil-military fusion, a policy that purposefully integrates civilian industries, research institutions, and private-sector talent into projects with both commercial and defense objectives. As a result, instruments initially portrayed as scientific or economic assets can often augment military readiness. China’s diverse satellite portfolio now supports a spectrum of functions ranging from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to communications, navigation, and timing—all vital for guiding weapons systems, coordinating forces, and maintaining situational awareness. These systems, analysts suggest, could even enable Beijing to monitor or respond to potential attacks on the United States or its allied networks.
Defense officials in Washington anticipate that Beijing will intensify its development of electronic warfare assets, ground-based anti-satellite weapons, and communication infrastructure designed to undermine opponents’ reliance on space. As stated in the Department of Defense’s most recent report, such counter-space operations are specifically intended to deny or degrade the adversary’s access to space whenever China perceives a threat to its national security. The implication is clear: in the event of a geopolitical confrontation, especially over contested areas such as Taiwan, China could attempt to blind or disrupt U.S. reconnaissance and coordination efforts.
Analysts Andrew Hanna and Kathleen Curlee, writing for the Council on Foreign Relations, warned that Chinese ground-based laser systems could target U.S. satellites responsible for observing or communicating around Taiwan. Should such assets be impaired or destroyed, American and allied forces might lose the capacity to plan or synchronize operations effectively, leaving them vulnerable and “fighting blind.” That loss of capability, they argued, could grant Beijing a decisive advantage, potentially influencing the outcome of a conflict even before full-scale hostilities began.
To counter such scenarios, the United States Space Force announced earlier this year its objective of ensuring American “space superiority” — a term denoting persistent freedom to operate in orbit while simultaneously preventing adversaries from doing the same. Achieving that superiority, however, will require not only advanced technology but also sustained investment, strategic foresight, and partnerships with both allies and private industry. For Washington, the accelerating pace of competition in orbit is more than a technical matter; it is a defining test of strategic endurance in the twenty-first century.
Sourse: https://www.businessinsider.com/speed-china-catching-up-space-concerning-us-space-force-general-2025-10
