A growing number of defense analysts and veteran aviators are voicing grave concerns that the long-standing supremacy of American airpower—once considered almost unassailable—is gradually eroding. Among them, a former U.S. Air Force pilot and noted authority on aerial warfare recently echoed the alarm raised by several senior officers, warning that America’s air dominance is, in his view, slipping. This anxiety, shared across strategic circles, reflects deepening unease over the aging condition of the U.S. Air Force fleet and its diminishing size, especially when contrasted with the rapid modernization and expansion of China’s air forces, which are advancing both in technological sophistication and operational readiness.
For years, top figures within the U.S. military establishment have openly expressed apprehension over the twin issues of an increasingly obsolete aircraft inventory and the slow pace of new procurement. While China’s air armada continues to grow in both scale and capability—integrating advanced systems and adopting aggressive training regimens—the U.S. fleet has instead been characterized by contraction and wear. In a comparison of the two nations’ air forces, measured not only by raw numbers but also by operational efficiency and technological maturity, retired Air Force Colonel John Venable, a former F‑16 pilot, lamented that the United States now “falls woefully short.” His statement underscores what many experts perceive as a shrinking margin of advantage that America once enjoyed decisively.
Although the United States still commands a formidable fleet exceeding two thousand fighter aircraft, only a portion of these are fully mission‑ready and capable of immediate deployment. The remainder, burdened by maintenance issues and aging airframes, cannot be counted on for sustained operations. Pentagon projections suggest an ongoing decline in total aircraft numbers—including bombers, tankers, and transport planes—as old platforms are retired faster than new ones are introduced. The procurement rate of next‑generation jets simply cannot offset the attrition of legacy systems. Compounding the challenge, many of the aircraft that remain in service frequently miss their expected mission‑capable benchmarks, pointing to mounting maintenance and readiness shortfalls that constrain the Air Force’s flexibility in a crisis.
Officials within the service acknowledge that the total number of aircraft will likely continue to shrink over the next decade, yet they assert that this quantitative decline will be compensated by qualitative improvements. Their strategic rationale—often referred to as a “divest to invest” approach—prioritizes phasing out older planes to channel scarce funding toward advanced technologies deemed essential for prevailing in high‑intensity combat against peer adversaries. In theory, this leaner but more capable force would maintain what defense planners call “overmatch.” In practice, however, this modernization pathway has been uneven and uncertain. Numerous development programs have faced steep delays, scaled‑down production runs, or outright cancellations due to technical setbacks or budgetary constraints. Analysts such as Venable and Joshua Baker, writing earlier this year in a report for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, cautioned that the historical record shows a pattern of promised capabilities materializing in far fewer numbers than planned—citing past examples like the limited procurement of the B‑2 Spirit stealth bomber and the F‑22 Raptor, both initially envisioned in far greater quantities than were ultimately achieved.
Speaking at the Air, Space & Cyber Conference in September, Venable highlighted the pace and scope of China’s modernization drive. He observed that Beijing has now re-equipped nearly its entire front‑line fleet with fourth‑ and fifth‑generation fighters, underscoring a sweeping upgrade of its aerial combat capabilities. According to his assessment, the Chinese military can now dispatch roughly 1,100 fighter aircraft over the Taiwan Strait without requiring mid‑air refueling—a significant operational advantage due to geographic proximity. By contrast, American forces would need to undertake lengthier sortie routes from bases often situated hundreds or even thousands of miles away, thereby straining fuel resources and reducing on‑station time in potential combat scenarios.
While the United States still possesses critical advantages in several key areas—such as stealth technology, joint logistics, tactical experience, and robust alliance networks that extend across the Indo‑Pacific—analysts warn that these traditional strengths are being steadily counterbalanced by China’s growing mass, integrated defenses, and advantageous geography. Beijing’s proximity to likely theaters of conflict allows it to concentrate power more efficiently, thus narrowing the margin of superiority Washington once took for granted. Meanwhile, China’s defense industry continues to produce new aircraft at a relentless pace. Admiral Samuel Paparo, commander of U.S. Indo‑Pacific Command, testified before Congress earlier this year that China is generating fighter jets at a rate roughly 20 percent higher than the United States. This surge in production comes as the U.S. Air Force’s 2026 budget proposal calls for purchasing only twenty‑four F‑35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighters—half of what was originally envisioned for that year, signaling a deceleration in modernization funded by constrained budgets and competing priorities.
Despite these headwinds, American aircraft such as the F‑35 remain combat‑proven and are widely assessed to retain qualitative advantages in systems integration, low‑observable design, and networked warfare. Yet even proponents of U.S. superiority concede that China’s progress presents an increasingly formidable challenge. Beyond hardware, attention is also turning toward pilot training and readiness trends. Venable pointed out that while American pilots currently average around 110 flight hours per year, Chinese aviators are logging closer to 200—nearly double. This discrepancy in flight time translates directly into greater familiarity with aircraft systems and sharper tactical proficiency, further eroding what had long been considered an American edge in pilot experience and operational readiness.
Taken together, these developments paint a troubling comparison for policymakers in Washington. “In terms of capacity, they have it,” Venable summarized. “In capability, they are competitive. When it comes to readiness—once our decisive advantage during the Cold War—it is no longer a tie.” His remarks encapsulate a sobering reality that the once unmatched triad of quantity, quality, and readiness now tilts precariously against U.S. dominance.
Underlying many of today’s problems is what analysts describe as a lingering legacy of post–Cold War austerity. After decades of budget cuts and reduced procurement, the Air Force entered a so‑called “capacity death spiral,” as declining numbers of aircraft imposed heavier operational burdens on the remaining fleet. Meanwhile, the U.S. Government Accountability Office has repeatedly warned that sustained overseas deployments over the past twenty years have taken a severe toll—degrading not only equipment and aircraft but also personnel morale and institutional readiness. These cumulative strains have coincided with a strategic reorientation across the Pentagon: a shift away from counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations, which dominated the early 21st century, toward preparing for great‑power competition against technologically advanced rivals.
Reflecting on this transition, Lt. Gen. Richard G. Moore, the Air Force’s deputy chief of staff for plans and programs, offered a stark numerical comparison last year. During the counterinsurgency era, he explained, the Air Force fielded close to 4,000 fighters with an average age of eight years; today, that number has fallen to roughly 2,000, with many boasting airframes that are nearly three decades old. Flight training has contracted just as dramatically—pilots now average only six to eight flying hours per month, a fraction of the time they logged in earlier generations. “We are prepared,” Moore concluded with blunt candor, “not for great‑power competition, but for counterinsurgency warfare.” His assessment captures a widespread concern: that the Air Force’s structure, tempo, and readiness plans reflect yesterday’s conflicts more than the emerging demands of tomorrow’s.
In sum, the evolving balance of airpower underscores a pivotal moment for U.S. defense policy. America’s technological edge, though still formidable, is no longer unchallenged. Unless modernization accelerates and readiness trends reverse, the once‑assumed advantage of the U.S. Air Force could continue to narrow—with profound implications for deterrence, strategy, and global security.
Sourse: https://www.businessinsider.com/us-airpower-lead-slipping-as-china-advances-capability-capacity-readiness-2025-10
