President Donald Trump’s recent post on Truth Social, in which he appeared to advocate for the resumption of U.S. nuclear testing after several decades of dormancy, has caused widespread confusion among nuclear policy experts, government analysts, and international observers. With the United States having ceased explosive nuclear testing in the early 1990s, Trump’s remarks seemed inconsistent with the facts publicly known about the structure, purpose, and current state of the American nuclear arsenal. From its very first sentence, the post exhibited factual ambiguities and interpretive problems—an unevenness that persisted throughout the entire statement. Instead of providing clear guidance or policy direction, the post seemed to raise more questions than it answered. Scholars in nuclear deterrence and arms control expressed uncertainty as to whether the language used in the message accurately represented the former president’s actual intentions or understanding of nuclear policy.
Mackenzie Knight-Boyle, a senior research associate with the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), characterized Trump’s statement as “inflammatory,” emphasizing its potential to escalate already-tense geopolitical dynamics. According to Knight-Boyle, such rhetoric risks reviving fears of a renewed nuclear arms race at a time when global stability appears increasingly fragile. This heightened sense of alarm, she noted, stems largely from misinformation and misunderstanding embedded in the original message.
In the opening line of Trump’s post, he claimed that the United States currently possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country in the world. However, according to the FAS’s most recent estimates, this assertion is demonstrably incorrect. As of this year, America’s nuclear warhead stockpile is believed to total approximately 3,700 weapons—placing it second, behind Russia’s estimated 4,309 warheads. China, by contrast, maintains an arsenal of roughly 600 nuclear warheads, giving it the world’s third-largest supply but still far behind the two preeminent nuclear powers. Thus, Trump’s only verifiably accurate statement in that sequence concerned China’s ranking. The confusion deepened when his post suggested that Beijing may reach parity with Washington or Moscow within five years, a projection that contradicts official Pentagon assessments. The Department of Defense projects that China may achieve approximately 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by the year 2030—well short of Russian or American totals.
Against this diplomatic backdrop, Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping recently met in Busan, South Korea, to discuss economic cooperation, including mutual tariff reductions, agricultural trade agreements, and collaborative energy initiatives. The timing of Trump’s nuclear statement before or during such high-stakes negotiations only amplified the tension surrounding it.
Historical data from the U.S. Department of Energy further reveal that the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile is currently at its smallest size since the early 1960s, a dramatic decline from the Cold War peak of over 31,000 warheads. Most of the nuclear arms that remain today were built in the 1970s and 1980s, reflecting an aging inventory that has been sustained primarily through refurbishment rather than large-scale production. Nevertheless, Trump’s post suggested that during his first term the United States supposedly “accomplished” the construction of what he described as the world’s most extensive nuclear arsenal, accompanied by what he called a comprehensive renovation and modernization of existing systems.
Experts such as Knight-Boyle find this claim difficult to reconcile with the factual record. She noted to Business Insider that it is reasonable to assume Trump was referring to the ongoing U.S. nuclear modernization program—an initiative that includes the development of advanced weapons delivery systems such as the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine, the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile, and the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider stealth bomber. However, all of those projects were initiated during President Barack Obama’s administration and remain incomplete to this day. Each is beset by cost inflation and significant delays. For example, the Sentinel ICBM’s cost projection has ballooned by approximately $140 billion, forcing the Pentagon to postpone deployment until well into the 2030s. Likewise, the Columbia-class submarine program has fallen years behind schedule, compelling the Navy to explore extending the operational lifespan of existing Ohio-class submarines. Similarly, the Air Force is maintaining its aging Minuteman III missile fleet longer than originally intended to prevent potential capability gaps.
The central message of Trump’s Truth Social declaration is that he has purportedly instructed “the Department of War” to begin nuclear testing “on an equal basis.” This terminology, however, provoked additional confusion, particularly because there is no contemporary “Department of War”; that term was replaced decades ago by the Department of Defense. Moreover, as Knight-Boyle explained, the responsibility for any nuclear explosive testing would not rest with the Defense Department at all, but with the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an agency within the Department of Energy that historically oversaw U.S. nuclear detonations prior to their suspension in 1992.
If Trump’s phrase referred instead to non-explosive testing—such as testing the performance or reliability of missile delivery systems—the United States already conducts such exercises routinely. The testing of Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles, for instance, is a standard practice intended to verify readiness and accuracy without involving any nuclear explosive yield. This distinction between yield-producing nuclear detonations and flight or systems testing is critical, and it remains wholly unclear which of these Trump intended to endorse. Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, noted in his own social media commentary that Trump’s language left it ambiguous whether he advocated for underground bomb testing, which would violate long-standing norms, or merely for continued missile test flights under Department of Defense supervision.
Neither the Pentagon nor the White House provided clarifying responses to queries from Business Insider, both pointing reporters back to Trump’s original Truth Social post.
It is worth recalling that discussions about resuming nuclear tests did surface within Trump’s first administration, though no such actions followed. Moreover, a former national security adviser to Trump later published an essay suggesting that a hypothetical second Trump presidency should reinitiate limited testing to maintain a “technological edge,” arguing for demonstrations of new warhead reliability and safety—something not practiced by the U.S. since the early 1990s. Yet, as Knight-Boyle points out, such a shift would require a complex chain of political and technical preparations: the reactivation of test sites, extensive safety assessments, and critical funding approvals from Congress. The entire effort would likely take several months, if not years, to implement.
In justifying his position, Trump claimed that renewed testing is necessary because “other countries” are already conducting their own. But, according to publicly available information, North Korea stands as the only nation to have executed a verified explosive nuclear test in this century. The U.S. has accused both Russia and China of conducting so-called “zero-yield” or subcritical experiments that might stretch the boundaries of the current testing moratorium, citing possible activity at Russia’s Novaya Zemlya and China’s Lop Nur sites. These allegations have not been conclusively proven, but they have contributed to broader mutual suspicion among major nuclear powers.
Nuclear analysts warn that if Washington decided to resume nuclear testing, this could trigger a chain reaction of similar decisions from other nuclear-armed nations—potentially undermining U.S. strategic advantages. The United States, having already conducted over a thousand nuclear tests—far more than both Russia and China combined—possesses an extensive scientific database and simulation capacity that largely substitute for physical detonations. Jeffrey Lewis, a leading scholar of nuclear arms control, has previously argued that America’s technological superiority in this field rests on the fact that it has ceased testing while investing in advanced computational modeling, which allows its arsenal to remain safe and reliable without further explosions. According to Lewis, if the U.S. were to break this moratorium, Russia and China would likely capitalize on each new test’s data to narrow the technological gap—ultimately eroding the advantage that American restraint has secured. Heather Williams, director of the Project on Nuclear Issues at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, similarly stressed that China in particular would benefit significantly, using renewed testing to refine warhead designs and expand its nuclear arsenal with greater efficiency.
The release of Trump’s message coincided with heightened tensions following Russia’s testing of several advanced delivery systems, including the Burevestnik nuclear-capable cruise missile and the Poseidon underwater drone. Although Russian officials claimed these trials did not involve nuclear detonations, the symbolism and timing of such exercises contributed to a climate of suspicion. Simultaneously, Trump’s statement surfaced just before his planned meeting with President Xi in South Korea—a nation that, while committed not to develop nuclear weapons, has faced increasing domestic debates about whether to reconsider that stance in light of North Korea’s provocations.
As Knight-Boyle summarized, global conditions are currently volatile, and loosely phrased statements about nuclear policy only deepen the sense of unease. Trump’s post, in her view, risks exacerbating strategic misunderstandings between the world’s most heavily armed nuclear states. By blending inaccurate claims with vague directives, it invites misinterpretation from foreign governments already on edge, thereby amplifying uncertainty at a moment when clarity is most essential.
Sourse: https://www.businessinsider.com/what-about-trumps-post-on-restarting-nuclear-testing-is-unclear-2025-10
