According to a newly released watchdog report, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth instructed his personal aide to install an unconventional and technically distinctive system within his secure Pentagon office—a facility designed to protect against electronic intrusion and unauthorized communications. This system, described in the investigative findings as particularly “unique,” granted Hegseth the ability to remotely access and operate his personal cellphone from inside that heavily restricted environment.
The report, prepared under the oversight of Pentagon Inspector General Steven Stebbins, forms part of a broader investigation into Hegseth’s communication practices, most notably his use of the encrypted Signal application to exchange sensitive operational details related to U.S. airstrike missions targeting Houthi rebels in Yemen earlier in the year. The inspector general determined that these actions, though possibly motivated by convenience, exposed U.S. military personnel to potential danger by undermining established security protocols designed to prevent the leakage of classified or operationally sensitive data.
Released on Thursday, the report dedicates a detailed section to describing how Hegseth’s assistant, a junior military officer, not only requested the development of the specialized system at the secretary’s instruction but also supervised its creation and installation. It was ultimately intended to provide Hegseth with remote control over his personal phone while he remained within the secure perimeter of his office—an area ordinarily subject to strict limitations regarding electronic devices. Photographs and schematics of the system’s prototype were included in the report but were fully redacted from public release due to the sensitivity of the hardware configuration. According to the findings, the customized setup—dubbed informally by internal staff as a “tether system”—was completed in late February 2025.
Technically, the device functioned as a wired extension that mirrored the contents and interface of Hegseth’s personal smartphone, which remained physically located outside the secured room. Using this link, the secretary could interact with a connected keyboard, mouse, and external monitor from within the protected space, effectively controlling the offsite device without breaching the official ban on bringing personal electronics inside. This complex configuration blurred the line between adherence to and circumvention of Pentagon communication-security policy.
Within the Pentagon’s physical security structure, particularly in offices assigned to high-ranking officials, it is normal practice to find secure lockers or specialized containment boxes designed for the storage of mobile phones, tablets, and other wireless devices before entry. Department of Defense regulations explicitly prohibit both government-issued and privately owned mobile devices from being brought into classified work areas or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs). Nevertheless, the inspector general’s office ultimately noted that it was unable to determine conclusively whether Hegseth’s installed system complied with or violated those requirements, since the custom apparatus had been discreetly dismantled and removed by the end of April 2025—less than two months after its installation.
In a written statement submitted to investigators in July, Hegseth openly confirmed that he had personally requested the creation of the system shortly after assuming his position. He explained that his intention had been to maintain limited access to his private communications during work hours without needing to step outside the secure office repeatedly. In his own words, he had asked his communications staff, upon starting in the role, whether an arrangement could be made to enable him to read and respond to personal or non-official messages in a secure, efficient manner. He emphasized that his communications team had developed what he believed was a compliant and carefully vetted technological solution, ensuring he could do so while still maintaining the confidentiality and physical security of classified defense operations.
The Secretary of Defense Communications Team defended their approach in interviews during the inquiry, affirming that the system met all Department of Defense information assurance and cybersecurity criteria, precisely because it did not involve the physical introduction of a mobile device into a restricted facility. From their perspective, the workaround respected the rules by adhering to the letter—if perhaps not the spirit—of the existing policy. Despite this rationale, the Pentagon’s public affairs office declined to comment immediately when contacted by Business Insider for clarification on the inspector general’s findings.
The controversy surrounding Hegseth’s technological choices deepened as investigators pursued an associated incident involving his use of the encrypted Signal app. The inquiry began after Jeffrey Goldberg, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic, was inadvertently added to group message threads in which Hegseth had shared sensitive operational information—including details extracted from a SECRET/NOFORN email—about the imminent timing and logistical components of U.S. air missions in Yemen. The inspector general emphasized that even accidental exposure of such data to unauthorized civilians posed an unacceptable level of risk. Had these message exchanges been intercepted or hacked by hostile entities, adversarial intelligence services might have gleaned insight into U.S. strike plans, potentially jeopardizing pilots and U.S. assets executing the missions.
While Hegseth maintained in an earlier statement to investigators that none of the material he shared could have endangered U.S. troops or compromised any mission objectives, the inspector general reached a starkly different conclusion. The report stated unambiguously that the secretary’s actions constituted a violation of core operational-security principles, introducing a tangible probability that mission success could have been compromised or that American servicemembers could have been placed in harm’s way. In summary, the investigation portrays a complex tension at the intersection of technological convenience, personal communication habits, and the uncompromising demands of national security—revealing how a well-intentioned pursuit of efficiency within top defense circles may inadvertently erode the protective boundaries upon which military safety depends.
Sourse: https://www.businessinsider.com/hegseth-had-system-installed-for-personal-cell-in-pentagon-office-2025-12
