Earlier this morning, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reached a unanimous 3–0 decision that significantly expands its regulatory reach. The agency has now granted itself the authority to impose retroactive bans on electronic gadgets, radio components, and other communication devices that were previously authorized for import or sale in the United States. This sweeping power applies in cases where the manufacturer is judged to represent a potential threat to national security. Officially, the FCC frames this decision as a necessary step to seal existing loopholes in U.S. communications law and to protect critical network infrastructure from foreign intrusion—specifically, from hidden backdoors or surveillance mechanisms embedded within telecommunications hardware and software, particularly those originating from China. Yet, beneath the official justification lies a broader implication: the rule could provide the Trump administration with a new mechanism for barring popular Chinese consumer technologies—such as drones and other wireless devices—from entering the American marketplace. One of the first companies that might feel the brunt of this change is DJI, the world’s most prominent drone manufacturer, despite the fact that the U.S. government has never presented concrete, publicly available evidence demonstrating that DJI’s products directly endanger national security.
Under the new timeline, beginning December 23rd—less than two months away as of this ruling—all forthcoming DJI products will automatically face an import prohibition unless an appropriate U.S. national security agency takes the affirmative step of certifying that the equipment poses no credible threat. The ban would arise because DJI and similar companies are slated to be added to the FCC’s so‑called “Covered List,” a registry created under the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act. That law forbids the FCC from approving the use of any internal radio technology originating from listed entities within American borders. Once a company lands on this list, its devices cannot receive the regulatory approvals required for legal sale or distribution in the country. As a result, any importation of such products—regardless of their popularity or purpose—would automatically violate U.S. law.
DJI has confirmed that no domestic security agency has yet taken responsibility for conducting the mandated audit that might clear its products. According to Adam Welsh, the company’s global head of policy, more than ten months have elapsed with no indication that the review process has even begun. Welsh emphasized in statements to *The Verge* that DJI enthusiastically welcomes a formal evidence‑based investigation. In his words, the company is urging the U.S. government either to initiate the long‑delayed review or to grant an extension so that the process can unfold transparently and fairly, without prematurely endangering American jobs, consumer safety, or innovation within the drone industry.
When the same issue was discussed earlier this year, Welsh had indicated that the company did not foresee a total ban. Back in February, he speculated that even in a worst‑case scenario—namely, DJI being added to the Covered List—the prohibition would not apply retroactively. He described a potentially illogical situation: consumers in the United States could continue buying existing models such as the Mavic line, while only newer iterations would become unavailable domestically but remain on sale in Canada, Mexico, and the rest of the world. However, the most recent decision suggests otherwise. The FCC’s new order introduces the possibility of retroactive enforcement, though it contains three significant qualifications: first, the government is not confiscating or de‑authorizing devices already in consumers’ possession; second, each case will be reviewed individually, product by product; and third, before any retroactive ban is implemented, the public will be given the chance to comment on the proposal.
A lengthy 60‑page fact sheet explaining the FCC’s new procedures underscores these points explicitly. It reassures consumers that manufacturers will not be compelled to replace equipment already sold and that existing products may continue to be used legally. Instead, the Commission will undertake a “public interest analysis” for any device under review. In these evaluations, regulators must give special consideration to any identified national security risks, while also allowing at least 30 days for open public comment before finalizing any decision.
Although there remains limited publicly available evidence to indicate that DJI’s drones constitute a greater security risk than comparable technologies offered by other companies, understandable apprehension persists among policymakers and consumers alike. The primary concern is that devices capable of capturing high‑resolution aerial imagery could, at least theoretically, transmit data back to entities in China through covert channels. This suspicion has persisted despite a lack of definitive proof. DJI itself is currently appealing a legal decision that permits the U.S. Department of Defense to label it a “Chinese Military Company.” The presiding judge in that case concluded only that sufficient uncertainty remains regarding the company’s corporate ties, not that DJI is directly controlled by the Chinese government.
For those who view the matter through a lens of precaution, closing these regulatory loopholes may appear rational—particularly in light of allegations that DJI has sought to circumvent restrictions by establishing a network of shell companies. Reports have suggested that certain drones and accessories—such as the Skyrover drone and Xtra camera line—may, in fact, be DJI products rebranded to obscure their origin. When questioned by *The Verge* during multiple investigative reports, DJI representatives notably declined to either confirm or deny their connection to these devices. Independent researcher Konrad Iturbe, an avid observer of DJI’s corporate footprint, maintains a public GitHub repository cataloging suspected DJI affiliates and front companies, many of which share distinctive technical signatures or design characteristics traceable to DJI. In one example, Iturbe identifies these subsidiaries by detecting the specific radio frequencies used by the company’s proprietary OcuSync transmitters—the same frequency patterns that enable its drones to maintain long‑range, low‑latency video transmission.
The new FCC order significantly strengthens the government’s ability to act against such disguised or indirectly manufactured products. The Commission will now have explicit authority to block any device that contains a component designed, assembled, or otherwise developed by a blacklisted company. As the FCC document clarifies, a product will generally be considered to have been “produced” by an entity if that entity participated in any stage of its creation, including design or component fabrication. Consequently, even equipment assembled under a different brand name may fall within the ban’s scope if technological evidence links it back to DJI or any other restricted manufacturer.
Although DJI could conceivably attempt to sidestep enforcement—perhaps by modifying its components or using alternative communication standards—the unique radio signal patterns characteristic of its OcuSync system make such subterfuge increasingly difficult. Cameras that rely solely on conventional Wi‑Fi or Bluetooth, such as DJI’s well‑regarded Osmo Pocket 3, might be easier to import at first glance, but they too remain vulnerable to prohibition unless explicitly cleared by authorities. As a default rule, therefore, DJI will have to cease importing virtually all new devices that depend on radio transmission technology by the December 23rd deadline unless a recognized national security agency steps forward to certify their safety. This decision marks a profound shift in how the U.S. governs the intersection of technology, commerce, and national defense—ushering in a more cautious, security‑oriented era for consumer electronics crossing international borders.
Sourse: https://www.theverge.com/report/808104/fcc-order-retroactive-ban-transmitter-national-security
