4. For a fixed duration of three years, terminating on November 1, 2027, Google is expressly prohibited from allocating or distributing any portion of the revenue generated through the Google Play Store to any individual or corporate entity that is engaged in the distribution of Android applications. This restriction also extends to any party that has publicly declared its intention, or even indicated the possibility, of creating or launching an alternative Android application distribution platform or marketplace. The intent of this provision is to prevent Google from providing financial incentives that might suppress or distort competition in the app distribution ecosystem.
5. For that same three-year period ending on November 1, 2027, Google is barred from using financial arrangements—whether in the form of direct payments, revenue-sharing agreements, or preferential access to any Google-related product or service—as leverage to require app developers to debut their software either exclusively or primarily within the Google Play Store. In effect, this clause prevents Google from conditioning important economic or operational benefits on exclusivity commitments that could hinder fair competition and the ability of developers to freely choose distribution channels.
6. Extending further, and under identical time restrictions, Google is not permitted to condition financial benefits, revenue-sharing participation, or access to core Google services on an app developer’s agreement to refrain from offering certain differentiated versions of their applications through alternative Android app stores. More specifically, Google may not compel developers to ensure that the version of an app on a rival distribution platform lacks features that are either made available or absent in the Play Store’s version. This measure protects developers’ creative freedom and ensures consumers can enjoy feature-complete variations across different marketplaces.
7. Likewise, until November 1, 2027, Google is prohibited from tying crucial financial incentives, revenue arrangements, or access to its products and services to agreements with device manufacturers (often referred to as Original Equipment Manufacturers, or OEMs) or mobile carriers requiring that the Google Play Store appear preinstalled in a specific position or location on Android devices. This prevents Google from using preinstallation placement as a bargaining tool to secure dominance within the Android ecosystem, thereby fostering a more neutral and competitive device environment.
9. Another central provision effective for three years mandates that Google may not require developers to exclusively use Google Play Billing for processing in-app transactions, nor may it forbid the adoption of other in-app payment mechanisms. Equally, developers cannot be prohibited from informing their users about alternative payment options beyond Google Play Billing. Furthermore, Google may not impose price-setting obligations that depend on whether a developer chooses Google Play Billing or another method. This provision safeguards pricing autonomy, enhances transparency, and promotes greater consumer choice with respect to payment channels.
10. Similarly, throughout the same restricted period, Google must not erect barriers preventing developers from openly communicating with users about app prices or availability outside of the Google Play Store environment. Developers retain the right to inform users about alternative purchase or download options, including supplying direct links to obtain the app via non–Play Store channels. This ensures that users remain aware of choices beyond Google’s ecosystem and that developers enjoy the freedom to expand their reach without suppression.
13. Within a strict thirty-day window following the issuance of this order, both Epic and Google are obligated to jointly recommend a Technical Committee composed of three members to the Court. Each party will appoint a single representative, and those two appointees will then collectively select a neutral third member. Once formally approved by the Court, this Technical Committee will serve as an intermediary mechanism tasked with overseeing disputes, resolving implementation concerns, and providing guidance regarding the technological and procedural obligations mandated by these provisions. Should disagreements arise that the Technical Committee cannot resolve, either party holds the right to seek judicial intervention. While the Committee itself cannot alter or extend any deadlines established within this order, it may nonetheless offer recommendations to the Court either supporting or opposing extension requests. Importantly, the financial responsibility for compensating Committee members will be shared: Epic and Google will each bear the costs of their own appointed representatives, while the expenses associated with the jointly selected third member will be divided equally between them. This structure ensures fairness, accountability, and balance in the process of overseeing enforcement of the Court’s directives.
Sourse: https://www.theverge.com/news/778332/google-epic-play-store-lawsuit-30-days-supreme-court
