Recent developments have shed additional, though still perplexing, light on former President Donald Trump’s intentions regarding a potential revival of U.S. nuclear testing. Statements from senior government officials, coupled with Trump’s own public assertions, have intensified speculation rather than clarifying the situation. Although there is now a richer collection of remarks to analyze, the precise nature of what the administration intends to undertake remains ambiguous and subject to differing interpretations among experts and policymakers alike.
In a post shared on Truth Social this past Wednesday, Trump announced that he had formally directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to begin the procedural steps toward the resumption of what he described as the “testing of our Nuclear Weapons.” The former president characterized this proposed action as a necessary and proportionate response to the recent nuclear testing activities allegedly conducted by foreign powers. His invocation of reciprocal action suggested a stance that the United States should not remain idle while other nations engage in nuclear test detonations or demonstrations of weapons capability.
Trump’s statement, however, was met with immediate confusion among nuclear policy specialists and even within the upper ranks of the U.S. military command structure. Many observers, including some inside his own administration, expressed uncertainty regarding whether the president was referring to full-scale nuclear explosive tests, simulations, or other forms of technical assessments. Notably, Vice Admiral Richard Correll, nominated to head the U.S. Strategic Command—the branch responsible for oversight of the American nuclear arsenal—told members of the Senate Armed Services Committee that he would not presume the president’s words indicated a literal intent to conduct explosive nuclear detonations. Correll clarified that he lacked specific insight into the president’s objectives but affirmed that the existing U.S. testing framework, which includes sophisticated computational modeling, advanced simulations, and limited subcritical testing of fissile materials, remains both scientifically rigorous and dependable for verifying weapon reliability.
Later that same Thursday, Trump addressed reporters once more, reiterating his view that the United States “does not do nuclear testing” and has refrained from such activities for many years. He further implied that renewed testing might now be justified, framing it as a logical and defensive response to the apparent testing programs of other nations. His remarks appeared to refer specifically to the category of testing that the United States has abstained from since 1992, when it instituted a moratorium on full-scale nuclear explosions. “They seem to all be nuclear testing,” Trump observed, emphasizing that America possesses more nuclear weapons than any other country yet has voluntarily ceased testing them. He concluded by suggesting that fairness and strategic prudence demanded symmetrical behavior: “With others doing testing, I think it’s appropriate that we do also.”
This suggestion immediately revived dormant concerns about the potential erosion of the so-called “zero-yield” standard, an international norm that prohibits nuclear tests generating explosive yields. Analysts have long suspected certain rival powers—particularly Russia and China—of possibly conducting experiments that edge close to this forbidden threshold. In recent months, satellite imagery and intelligence assessments have even hinted at technical activity observed at two historically significant nuclear sites: China’s Lop Nur facility and Russia’s Novaya Zemlya range. Despite these observations, the only confirmed and documented nuclear detonations in the twenty-first century remain those carried out by North Korea at its Punggye-ri test site.
The former president’s post referred specifically to ordering the Department of Defense to resume testing, a statement that added further confusion to the debate. Specialists were quick to point out that, under U.S. law and longstanding protocol, the actual conduct of nuclear explosive tests—or any experiment involving fissile materials at that level—would fall under the supervision of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an agency within the Department of Energy rather than the DoD. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth sought to clarify the administrative overlap by explaining that his department would “work with the Department of Energy,” but he declined to elaborate on crucial details—such as the type of testing envisioned, the proposed schedule, or the exact distribution of responsibilities between the two departments.
Hegseth also asserted that the United States remains committed to maintaining the most robust and technologically advanced nuclear arsenal on the planet, insisting that the guiding principle of American strategy continues to be “peace through strength.” Consequently, while his comments echoed traditional deterrence rhetoric, they did little to illuminate the substance or feasibility of Trump’s proposed testing agenda. Nuclear scholar Jeffrey Lewis, reacting to Hegseth’s statements on the platform X, remarked that the discourse seemed improvised, remarking pointedly that “it seems like they are just making this up as they go along.”
Other senior figures within the administration, including Vice President JD Vance, later attempted to contextualize Trump’s comments without fully expanding upon them. Vance noted that the president’s words “speak for themselves,” stressing that maintaining a functional, tested, and trustworthy nuclear deterrent constitutes a vital component of U.S. national security. He emphasized the importance of verifying the operational integrity of America’s nuclear arsenal, but, like other officials, did not provide any meaningful insight into how or when such testing might occur. As of now, officials have sought to reassure the public that the country’s nuclear weapons remain reliable and safe, yet they have offered scant details on the structure or purpose of any forthcoming tests.
When Trump initially posted about nuclear testing, many defense analysts speculated that his comments might not concern explosive detonations at all but rather tests of various delivery systems. These include the regular evaluation of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), strategic bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, all of which form the triad of systems capable of deploying nuclear warheads. The Department of Defense routinely conducts such exercises even under the current moratorium. For instance, the U.S. Air Force frequently publicizes the launch of unarmed Minuteman III ICBMs as part of their ongoing reliability assessments.
Responding to additional inquiries regarding the supposed plan, Pentagon representatives referred journalists to Hegseth’s earlier remarks and declined to issue further comment. Similarly, the Department of Energy—whose jurisdiction would be central to any resumption of nuclear testing—chose not to respond publicly, while the White House directed all questions to Trump’s previous statements made to the press.
Speaking aboard Air Force One on Friday, Trump remained characteristically direct yet vague in his tone. He confirmed once again that “we’re going to do some testing,” framing it as an act of national parity: “Other countries do it. If they’re going to do it, we’re going to do it.” Although he refrained from specifying whether these tests would take place underground, above ground, or through alternative experimental configurations, his choice of language suggested a renewed willingness to resume once-abandoned practices. Some experts have speculated that the president’s renewed interest in testing may have been provoked by reports of Russia’s trials of new nuclear-powered cruise missiles and underwater torpedoes, technologies designed to demonstrate advanced capabilities in nuclear propulsion and strategic reach.
Without disclosing logistical details, Trump insisted he is fully briefed on the matter, asserting, “I know exactly what we’re doing, where we’re doing it.” He assured reporters that further announcements would follow, alluding to the existence of longstanding U.S. testing sites such as the Nevada Test Site—renamed the Nevada National Security Site—and the historic Pacific Proving Grounds located in the Marshall Islands. These were once epicenters of nuclear experimentation during the height of the Cold War.
The reaction among the global nuclear policy community has been one of deep apprehension. Should the United States resume explosive nuclear testing after more than three decades of restraint, many fear it could trigger a destabilizing chain reaction, encouraging rival states to conduct their own tests and thereby undermining the fragile international consensus against nuclear detonations. For this reason, experts warn that the implications of Trump’s announcement extend far beyond American borders, potentially reshaping strategic doctrines, arms control negotiations, and the global norm that has thus far prevented a return to an era of atmospheric and underground nuclear blasts.
Sourse: https://www.businessinsider.com/trumps-nuclear-testing-plan-is-still-pretty-murky-2025-10
