The recent confrontation in which Warsaw found itself grappling with more than a dozen Russian drones penetrating its national airspace has underscored, according to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, NATO’s urgent need to rethink how it protects its skies from Moscow’s aggressive aerial tactics. Speaking at a press conference in Finland on Thursday, Zelenskyy did not merely report on the event but rather used it as a cautionary lesson directed at Western allies. He warned that the alliance cannot continue to depend primarily on extremely costly air defense missiles when faced with Russia’s increasingly frequent deployment of inexpensive long‑range drones, which are designed to overwhelm traditional systems.

Polish authorities confirmed that at least nineteen Russian-operated drones entered their airspace on Wednesday, a serious breach that immediately prompted a military response. NATO aircraft stationed in the region, including advanced Dutch F‑35 fighter jets, were scrambled to confront the intrusions. Simultaneously, Poland raised the alert status of its Patriot missile batteries — a decision demonstrating both vigilance and concern. Yet Zelenskyy highlighted a fundamental imbalance: while a single Patriot interceptor missile carries a price tag of between two and three million U.S. dollars, the drones deployed against them, such as the Iranian‑derived Shahed or Geran models, cost no more than one hundred thousand dollars each. As he crisply observed, using weaponry valued at millions to neutralize drones that are manufactured for a fraction of that cost is neither an efficient nor a sustainable approach.

The incident itself involved multifaceted responses. European forces succeeded in shooting down at least three Russian drones, which analysts believe were either explosive Shahed systems or deceptive Gerbera models meant to divert air defenses. Evidence suggests that NATO’s defensive countermeasures included not only surface‑launched interceptors but also conventional air‑to‑air munitions. Social media footage captured by Polish civilians showed fighter jets unleashing missiles in the night sky. Following the encounters, fragments were discovered on the ground from at least one AIM‑120 Advanced Medium‑Range Air‑to‑Air Missile, itself valued at approximately 1.2 million dollars. The NATO jets involved were also armed with AIM‑9 Sidewinders, another missile system with a unit cost of roughly four hundred thousand dollars. In Zelenskyy’s judgment, relying on weapons of such extraordinary expense to defeat relatively unsophisticated drones reflects a flawed strategy: it may protect civilians in the immediate moment, but it cannot form the backbone of NATO’s long‑term air defense doctrine.

He contrasted NATO’s actions with Ukraine’s own experience in combating massive dronelike assaults. For the Ukrainian military, daily life includes confronting waves ranging from five hundred to as many as eight hundred Shahed drones in a single day, often launched alongside more destructive ballistic and cruise missiles. Confronted with this scale of attack, Kyiv quickly realized that employing only costly high‑end interceptors would exhaust resources within days. Instead, Ukraine developed what Zelenskyy describes as a multifaceted or “multisystem” approach. This includes mobile machine‑gun teams mounted on vehicles to provide flexible ground fire, the extensive use of electronic warfare to disrupt drone guidance systems, the deployment of specialized interception drones, and the mobilization of helicopters capable of pursuing and destroying aerial intruders. Such tools, relatively inexpensive compared to missile interceptors, are complemented by reserving advanced Western‑supplied air defense missiles for the most dangerous threats: the ballistic and cruise missiles whose destructive power far surpasses that of Shahed drones. Zelenskyy urged NATO countries to learn from this balancing strategy, emphasizing that currently, only Ukraine and Russia have evolved such layered methodologies for combating drone warfare.

This episode in Poland has therefore been widely interpreted not as an isolated breach, but as a stress test of NATO’s broader readiness to defend its airspace from evolving threats. Zelenskyy himself openly concluded that, in his assessment, no NATO member appears fully prepared for the scale of aerial drone warfare Russia has normalized. Underscoring Ukraine’s frontline expertise, he reiterated that Kyiv had already extended offers to provide practical assistance and training to Poland and other member states in order to strengthen their resilience. As he bluntly stated, Patriots are invaluable for the interception of high‑speed ballistic missiles, but when it comes to countering swarms of drones, their operational utility is limited. This mismatch becomes glaring when enemy forces are able to deploy hundreds of Shaheds in a single offensive wave.

Beyond highlighting deficiencies, Zelenskyy revealed that he has been engaged in diplomatic conversations aimed at building a more coordinated international front. Discussions included Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk as well as leaders in the United Kingdom, Italy, and senior NATO officials. The vision being explored is the establishment of a joint, integrated air defense system across NATO states, designed not only to protect individual national skies but also to construct a collective shield that can withstand the scale of modern drone warfare. Zelenskyy reported frankly on social media that he and Tusk had reached an agreement for deeper military cooperation, with further coordination across all alliance members to follow.

The incursions themselves — nineteen unmanned systems breaching Polish skies in a single day, the latest of several such violations in recent weeks — have been widely interpreted by NATO analysts as deliberate provocations. According to alliance leaders, Russia’s strategy appears to involve probing Western responses, forcing costly defensive actions, and testing the cohesion of allied military planning. Predictably, Moscow dismissed NATO’s accusations as groundless, neither confirming nor denying responsibility for drones straying into Polish airspace. Warsaw’s alarm was serious enough, however, that it invoked Article 4 of the NATO Treaty, a clause reserved for circumstances in which a member state perceives a genuine threat to its safety and requests urgent consultations with allies. Such an invocation raises the possibility of reinforcements and other rapid measures on the territory of the threatened nation. As NATO noted, since the alliance’s creation, Article 4 has been employed on only eight previous occasions, underscoring the exceptional nature of the current situation.

From Zelenskyy’s perspective, the lesson could not be clearer: European security requires an immediate transformation of its defensive mindset. In an era when adversaries employ waves of low‑cost drones to deplete comparatively priceless interceptors, traditional strategies are untenable. Only by adopting layered, cost‑effective, and integrated systems — like those Ukraine has been compelled to pioneer — can NATO hope to protect its skies effectively and sustainably.

Sourse: https://www.businessinsider.com/nato-poland-russian-drones-not-the-way-ukraine-war-zelenskyy-2025-9